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ABSTRACT:
Merger activity had dramatically increased in the banking industry during the 1990s. In the
last few years, many of these mergers have been announced as a "merger of equals."
However, many studies have suggested that mergers of equals are different from acquisitions
(Houston and Ryngaert 1994, 2000). This finding could suggest that there are fundamental
differences between the returns for mergers of equals and acquisitions of banking firms. To
test if mergers of equals in fact differ from acquisitions, I examine bidder and target returns,
number of days to complete the transaction, and returns based on headquarter location.
Overall, I find that there are statistically significant differences in the returns to bidders and
targets in mergers of equals versus acquisitions. These results suggest that future studies that
examine wealth effects from bank mergers need to control for mergers of equals.

1. INTRODUCTION
Consolidation is an intriguing tool that banks use for a variety of purposes: to
improve unsatisfactory revenue growth, increase products, expand services or customer base,
or capitalize on economies of scale. Each bank has a spectrum of options to consider, which
include: pursue an independent course, make a substantial bank acquisition, concentrate on
purchase of a specialty business, join with another bank in a merger of equals, or sell to a
bank that pays an attractive takeover premium.
In general, a merger of equals is the combination of two similar firms, where similar
may be based on asset size, line of business, number of employees, composition of board of
directors, or other factors. A merger of equals may be attractive to the merging banks
because of the impression that neither bank would emerge as the dominant partner, although
this is not necessarily true. Furthermore, it is likely that neither partner in a merger of equals
would have to pay a relatively high premium to complete the transaction. Other reasons why
a merger of equals may be appealing include protection from an unwanted suitor or hostile
takeover and the opportunity to form a strategic alliance. While banks may favor a merger of
equals for these reasons, the shareholders of a potential target firm often do not favor a
merger of equals because the shareholders may not gain from these benefits. In a merger of
equals, neither institution benefits from a rich takeover premium for its stock, while in an
acquisition, the target firm typically experiences a large significant gain from the premium
paid.
Therefore, shareholders of a bank in a merger of equals firm would have to compare
the gains they may have realized in an acquisition with the earnings per share gains the new
bank delivers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the earnings per share gains for target firms

are lower than potential gains from a takeover premium. J.W. Milligan cites the 1993 merger
of equals between KeyCorp and Society Corp as an example. In this case, the new bank,
KeyCorp, promised to exploit several revenue synergies, but failed to deliver any significant
increases in revenue growth. At the merger announcement, KeyCorp boasted that its
mortgage lending business had a great opportunity for revenue growth, but later claimed that
the business was too volatile and KeyCorp was forced to sell the mortgage lending business
off.
This is only one example in which banks involved in a merger of equals are unable to
follow through on revenue growth promises resulting from a merger of equals. For largescale bank mergers, Boyd and Graham (1991) note that most studies fail to find economies of
scale in the banking industry for firms with deposits greater than $100 million. Furthermore,
recent studies have shown that there is little evidence of a decrease in operating expenses
arising from mergers of equals (Milligan 1996).
Therefore, shareholders of banks in a merger of equals may experience lower stock
returns than the premium paid for their stock if the bank had been acquired. As a result,
shareholders tend to prefer an acquisition while management may pursue a merger of equals
as a strategic option for a bank. This study will examine the wealth effects around 400 bank
merger announcements that were completed between the 1990 and 1998 time period in order
to evaluate the dynamics of mergers of equals compared to overall bank merger activity.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follow: Section 2 provides a review of
literature related to the focus of this study; Section 3 details the hypotheses of the study;
Section 4 describes the data selection techniques and the merger sample used; Section 5
summarizes the statistics of the sample; Section 6 discusses the tests of the hypotheses;
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Section 7 provides correlation and the results of the regression analysis; finally, Section 8
provides conclusions and implications for future studies.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
According to Weston, Siu, and Johnson (2001), mergers are grouped into one of three
economic categories. Horizontal mergers involve two firms that operate and compete in the
same kind of business activity. Vertical mergers occur between firms in different stages of
production. Conglomerate mergers involve firms engaged in unrelated types of business
activity. Furthermore, conglomerate mergers can be broken down into four subcategories:
Investment conglomerates, financial conglomerates, managerial conglomerates, and
concentric conglomerates (complementary in relative strengths).
There have been a significant number of studies on mergers and acquisitions of both
financial and non-financial firms. In general, the results of these studies examine the wealth
effects of mergers and acquisitions to determine if these effects can be explained by specific
variables. These variables include: size of bidder and target in terms of assets, size in terms
of number of employees, board of directors composition, and geographic location, among
others. In general, prior studies find that firms merge in order to accomplish economies of
scale and/or economies of scope, employee diversification, to increase their product line, or
to increase their customer base (Koch and MacDonald 2000). Firms are merging to exploit
synergies, which will enhance their profitability.l
Bank mergers have been an especially interesting segment of merger and acquisition
analysis. The 1990s saw increased bank consolidation as banks attempt to cut overhead
1 See Weston, Siu, and Johnson (2001) for an overview of empirical results of merger studies over the last 20
years.
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costs, eliminate branch duplication, enter into new markets, enhance product lines, and
increase market share through brand recognition and elimination of a competitor. The
removal of state and federal regulations in the 1990s (i.e. the enactment of interstate
branching laws), provided banks the opportunity to consolidate at an increasing scale. In
particular, Becher (2001) documents that bank merger activity increased 215% from the early
1980s until the 1990s.
For the most part, large banks continue to acquire relatively smaller institutions such
that the number of banks is declining and fewer banks control a greater percentage of
banking resources (Koch and MacDonald 2000). Moreover, banks are facing increased
competition as mergers among foreign banks and cross-border mergers are becoming
increasingly common. According to Koch and MacDonald (2000) there is a push to create a
nationwide or even a globalwide bank that provides a full range of financial products. One
of the easiest and most cost-effective ways to achieve globalwide services is to merge rather
than build new lines of business from the ground up.
In light of recent merger activity, mergers of equals have become an interesting topic.
In the banking industry, a large number of mergers have been announced as a "merger of
equals." Some of these mergers of equals include: BankAmerica and NationsBank (1998),
Chase Manhattan and Chemical Banking (1996), First Chicago NBD and Bank One (1998),
and the most recent announcement First Union and Wachovia (2001). Since many of these
mergers of equals have occurred in the past few years, most of the literature examining bank
mergers during the 1990s does not address the potential implications and issues involved
with this type of merger. Not until recently has there been enough data to conduct significant
tests on the dynamics of mergers of equals.
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Reviewing the literature on bank mergers in the 1990s shows that few studies address
the issue of merger of equals. In most studies that analyze bank mergers, mergers of equals
are not addressed, and are lumped with acquisitions. If mergers of equals have significantly
different dynamics than acquisitions, the results from these studies may be misleading.
Houston and Ryngaert (1994) were one of the first studies to acknowledge that
mergers of equals may differ from acquisitions, "We eliminate 'mergers of equals' from the
sample because it is unclear which firm is the bidder. This is necessary when we consider
separately the abnormal returns of the bidder and target banks." However in their study, only
four firms were classified as mergers of equals out of a sample of 153. Such a small number
is unlikely to significantly alter their results.
Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2000) in a later study, however, do not separate
mergers of equals from their overall sample when they analyze the merger gains from large
bank acquisitions. The authors' sample includes mergers where, "The target's assets were at
least 10 percent of the bidder's assets in the year preceding the merger." Although Houston,
James, and Ryngaert (2000) examine the asset ratio of the target and bidder, they do not
make reference to mergers where the asset ratio was near 50 percent and do not implement
any control variable for mergers of equals. Therefore, their study does not examine if the
gains from mergers of equals are fundamentally different from the gains of large bank
mergers.
Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995) also address the issue of mergers of equals, "We
hypothesize that the larger is the relative asset ratio [measured by Total Assets of
Target/Total Assets of Acquirer], the greater is the opportunity for merger-related
efficiencies to be realized." The authors further mention that they believe there is an inverse
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relationship between relative size of and the purchase premium expected. The reason behind
this is that, "Large targets offer acquirers fewer opportunities to introduce.. .more profitable
products, as the target would already be offering products similar to those offered by the
acquirers. Hence, in these situations, acquirers would offer less to the targets' owners, other
things equal." Basically, Benston, Hunter, and Wall estimate that the closer in size the target
and bidder are in terms of assets, the smaller the premium will likely be offered and that
greater merger-related efficiencies will be realized.
Finally, Brewer, Jackson, and Jagtiani (2000) mention the importance of mergers that
involve two organizations of equal size. However, their sample of bank mergers in the 1990s
does not exclude mergers of equals, nor does it acknowledge that they may be different than
acquisitions. Brewer, Jackson, and Jagtiani (2000) cite that, "A countervailing factor in large
bank mergers, however, is the difficulty of merging two large sized banking organizations, or
two organizations of equal size.. .Melding cultures is more difficult and costly when the
target is more equal in size to the acquirer." Therefore, while this study recognizes the
difficulty involved in merging corporate cultures in a merger of equals and alludes to the
additional costs involved, they do not address this issue in their analysis.

3. HYPOTHESES
In light of the large number of bank mergers designated as mergers of equals in the
last few years, merger analysis needs to be updated to examine the wealth effects of these
types of mergers. In particular, I developed the following hypotheses concerning the
outcome of my analysis:

6

HYPOTHESIS 1: Bidder and target stock returns around bank merger announcements are
different for mergers of equals than acquisitions.

The marketplace views mergers of equals differently than it views acquisitions. As
Benston, Hunt, and Wall (1995) insinuate, mergers of firms with approximately the same
asset size should have smaller premiums. In particular, in a merger of equals, stock price
reaction around the announcement date will reflect a small positive return for both firms. In
contrast, previous studies have shown that the target firm in an acquisition enjoys
approximately a 20% gain, while the bidder firm tends to experience a zero to -2% loss
around the initial announcement date.
Ball (2001) discusses the lawsuit Kirk Kerkorkian filed against DaimlerChrysler in
2000. Kerkorian claims, "That the company and its top executives deceived investors and
violated securities laws when they described the creation of the company as a merger of
equals rather than a takeover of Chrysler Corp. by Daimler-Benz AG." Kerkorkian's lawsuit
seeks about $2 billion in lost stock value, and additional punitive damages. Therefore,
Kerkorkian's lawsuit identifies with my hypothesis that a target firm in an acquisition would
receive a higher premium than a target firm in a merger of equals.

HYPOTHESIS 2: The time frame to complete, from initial announcement date to completion
date, in a merger of equals is longer than the time frame for an acquisition.

It will take longer to merge two similar-sized companies than it would to acquire a
smaller company. Brewer, Jackson, and Jagtiani (2000) suggest that merging two large
banks is more difficult. This may be true since merging two similar-sized companies is, in
essence, creating a new firm where a range of integration issues must be decided. Some
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fundamental issues that must be addressed include: the name of the firm, location of the
headquarters, who will be in control of the bank, and the future of the bank, among others,
and these issues must be reconsidered and agreed upon. When a company is acquired,
however, employees of the target firm are trained in the practices of the bidder firm and,
therefore, fewer restructuring issues must be resolved.

HYPOTHESIS 3: Due to geographic diversity of headquarters location, mergers of equals
will have smaller returns on average than acquisitions, which are more likely to be
geographically focused.
Studies have shown that mergers of firms with bidder and target headquarters in
different geographic locations experience lower returns than those mergers where both firms'
headquarters are located in the same geographic area (DeLong 2001). Therefore, mergers in
the same state should have higher stock returns than mergers in diverse locations. When
considering the average asset size for firms involved in a merger of equals, the size involves
two firms with relatively similar amounts of assets joining together versus a typical
acquisition which usually has a target firm that is considerably smaller than the acquiring
firm in terms of assets (combined assets from a merger of equals are greater than one small
and one large firm's assets combined).
Since a merger of equals usually involves two large firms, I would expect the
probability of both these firms being located in the same state to be relatively low. It is rare
that two large banks headquartered in the same state would merge, due to antitrust concerns,
if they have a large overlap in services they provide. There are several cases when a merger
of equals may be allowed due to the fact that, at the time, there existed many other
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competitors within the state (such as Central Pacific Corp and Wells Fargo (1990) in
California).
Prior to 1994, it was unlikely to see two banks headquartered in the same state merge
due to regulatory constraints. However, in 1994, the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, effectively allowed nationwide interstate branching.
By 1997, when Riegle-Neal had been fully implemented, competition had increased due to
interstate branching. As a result, it is likely that the number of mergers of equals in-state
increased significantly after Riegle-Neal.
Therefore, it can be hypothesized that mergers of equals often have firms that are
headquartered in different states, due to their large size and previous regulatory constraints.
Moreover, if mergers that expand across state have lower returns than focused locations, then
mergers of equals will more likely have lower returns than acquisitions. Controlling for
headquarters location, however, the results from hypothesis one would still hold.

4. DATA SELECTION
4.1 Merger Sample
To create a sample of bank mergers, all banks and bank holding companies that
complete a merger between the 1990 and 1998 time period are collected from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes. This results in a preliminary sample of 415 bank
mergers. Of these, one merger is removed because it is a partial sale of the bank rather than a
complete acquisition. Fourteen more are removed because the bidder is an international firm.
International firms potentially face different regulations and constraints than national firms,
which can affect disclosure, making it difficult to obtain information. Also, international
firms may not have public stock return data available on the CRSP tapes. Because of these
9

reasons, the dynamics of international bank mergers differ from domestic bank mergers and
are excluded from this sample.
Therefore, the final sample consists of 400 bank mergers completed during the 1990
and 1998 time period. The following variables are collected for both the bidder and the
target firms: CUSIP, assets one-year prior to announcement of the merger, merger
announcement and completion dates, merger amount, funding type (cash, stock, or
combination), and headquarters state.

4.2 Merger of Equals
To examine the wealth effects of mergers of equals, I create two samples. First, a
merger is classified as a merger of equals based on the SNL database. SNL database defines
a merger of equals as any merger reported by the merging institutions to be a merger of
equals. There is no attempt made to assess the accuracy of this classification or to set
definitional criteria. Out of the 400 mergers in my sample, 25 are classified as mergers of
equals in the SNL database.
However, several mergers were classified as mergers of equals by SNL in which the
two firms involved had dissimilar asset sizes, for example, Society and KeyCorp with an
asset ratio of 24.42 percent and Pacific Capital and Santa Barbara with an asset ratio of 32.44
percent. A current example of this dissimilarity in size is the recently announced merger of
equals between Wachovia and First Union (2001). Although these firms call the transaction
a merger of equals, First Union is more than three times the size of Wachovia in terms of
assets.
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Aside from the public mergers in my sample, SNL lists a merger as a merger of
equals involving a private target where its assets represent only nine percent of the combined
firms assets. This raises significant questions as to whether this is a merger of equals, even if
the firms involved claim it is so. The literature hypothesizes that the returns and complexity
of the merger are based on the banks having similar asset sizes. Merely labeling a merger as
a 'merger of equals' is not likely to provide the same results.
As a result, I create a second sample of mergers of equals based on the asset ratio.
Asset ratio is defined as the target firm's assets divided by the sum ofthe target and bidder
firm's assets. Defining mergers of equals based on asset ratio allows for cleaner tests of the
wealth effects from these mergers.
Asset Ratio = Target Assets/(Target + Bidder Assets)

(1)

Houston and Ryngaert (1994) define a transaction as a merger of equals, "When
either the assets or the equity value of the smaller firm would constitute over 45% of the
combined assets.. .ofthe two firms and the board of directors of the new firm will be
composed of equal numbers of directors from each firm."
However, there does not appear to be any empirical evidence to indicate what asset
ratio cutoff should be used in defining mergers of equals. To ensure that the percentage of
assets used does not affect my results, I use the following different asset ratio criteria: 40
percent, 35 percent, and 30 percent. For all the mergers where the asset ratio was greater
than or equal to the asset ratio criteria, the merger is classified as a merger of equals. This
calculation resulted in a sample of 45 bank mergers using an asset ratio of 40 percent or
higher, 54 bank mergers with an asset ratio of 35 percent or higher, and 78 bank mergers
with an asset ratio of 30 percent or higher.
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5. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Examining the data for the 400 bank mergers completed during the 1990 to 1998 time
period, the mean assets of all target firms one year prior to merger announcement is
$5,061.05 million (median of $586.15 million) (See Table 1). The mean assets of all the
bidder firms are $22,627.81 million (median of $9,679.72 million). Thus, on average, bidder
firms are 4.5 times larger than target firms in my sample.
For the remainder of the study, I use the 40 percent asset ratio criterion to classify
mergers of equals. I chose not to use the SNL database definition as it is a self-reported
classification and, therefore, I have no way of measuring the accuracy of this classification.
Nonetheless, using the 40 percent asset ratio, 22 of the 25 SNL mergers of equals are also
classified as mergers of equals in my sample.
The 35 percent and 30 percent asset ratio criteria add nine and 33 mergers
respectively, to the merger of equals sample. However, upon examining the returns, the
bidder and target firm returns are qualitatively the same for the acquisitions under all three
asset ratio criteria. In particular, the target returns increase as the asset ratio criteria
decreases, and bidder returns decrease as the asset ratio criteria decrease. This joint increase
in target returns and decrease in bidder returns is expected when increasing the allowable
asset ratio criteria based on overall merger returns. As a result, for the remainder of this
study, a merger of equals refers to my sample based on the 40 percent asset ratio criteria (See
Table 2).
The mean target firm's assets of mergers of equals are $27,856.00 million (which is
about 5.5 times higher than the target assets of all firms) with a median of$1,254.01 million.
The mean bidder firm's assets of mergers of equals are $29,621.58 million (median of
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$1,117.48 million). Therefore, the bidder firm's assets of mergers of equals are about the
same as the bidder assets for all firms. When removing the mergers of equals from the
sample (the acquisition sample) the target and bidder firm's assets both decreased, as
expected (mean target $2,171.55 million, mean bidder $21,741.27 million) (See Table 3).
The average merger amount for all firms is $887.62 million (median is $96.0 million).
However, the merger amount for just acquisitions is much lower, $461.26 million (median of
$93 million) which is about half of the mean for all firms. The mergers of equals have a
much higher mean of $4,251.11 million and a median of $106.5 million. Therefore, the
mean merger amount of mergers of equals is 4.8 times higher than that of all firms and 9.2
times higher than the acquisition mean merger amount.
The average number of days to complete the merger, however, is approximately the
same for all groups (203.5 for all firms, 204.3 for mergers of equals, and 203.4 days for
acquisitions). Also, the median number of days is also qualitatively the same (189 for all,
191 for acquisitions, and 185 for mergers of equals.
A breakdown by year of merger announcement shows that the majority of mergers in
my sample occurred after 1992 (See Table 4). As expected, most mergers of equals,
however, began after 1995 (1998 has the highest number of mergers of equals: 10). Thus it
appears that the passing of Riegle-Neal did increase the number of mergers of equals.
Moreover, the number of days to complete a merger has been decreasing since 1990. In
particular, the average number of days to complete a merger has decreased by more than half
from 1990 to 1998, 304.8 days and 154.1 days, respectively, despite the increase in number
of mergers of equals.
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Finally, in 1998, the average for all firms' target assets, bidder assets, and merger
amount are considerably higher than in previous years. For instance, the mean target firm's
assets in 1998 are $24,750.34 million versus $3,952.59 million in 1997 and $1,560.23 in
1996.

6. TEST OF HYPOTHESES
In order to test my hypotheses, I implement several techniques. First, I try to
ascertain whether there is a difference in mean returns for several different variables. Table 5
provides mean returns for each test, the number of observations included, and the p-value of
the t-test ofthe different means. A detailed list of the hypotheses and tests follows.

Hypothesis 1: Bidder and target stock returns around bank merger announcements are
different for mergers of equals than for acquisitions.

In order to test whether the returns for mergers of equals differ from the returns for
acquisitions, I compare the cumulative abnormal returns for all acquisitions versus the
returns for mergers of equals for both bidders and targets.
The mean returns for bidders in an acquisition are -1.26% while the returns for
bidders in a merger of equals is +2.07%. The results show that bidder returns in acquisitions

.

versus mergers of equals are statistically different, with a p-value of 0.02. This indicates that
there is a significant difference in the returns for bidders in an acquisition versus a merger of
equals.

Thus bidders experience higher returns around announcement date in a merger of

equals than around the announcement of an acquisition.
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The mean return for targets in an acquisition is 16.7% versus only 8.86% in a merger
of equals. As for target firms, there is a clear difference between the returns for target firms
in an acquisition versus a merger of equals (p-value equal to 0.00). Thus, target firms can
expect higher cumulative abnormal returns if they are acquired than if they were to enter a
merger of equals. Therefore, analysis of bank mergers that include mergers of equals need to
control for their different wealth effects.

Hypothesis 2: The time frame for a merger of equals is longer than the time frame for an
acquisition.
In order to test the length of days it takes to complete an acquisition versus a merger
of equals, I use the days to completion of all acquisitions and the days to completion of all
mergers of equals.
In the sample of bank mergers that I tested, the average time to complete an
acquisition is 203.4 days and 204.3 days for a merger of equals. Testing for a difference in
these two means find virtually no statistical difference (p-value equal to 0.95). Therefore, in
my sample the average time to complete either an acquisition or a merger of equals is
basically the same. The notion that the number of days to complete a merger is a proxy for
complexity does not appear to be true.

Hypothesis 3: In a merger of equals, the returns, on average, will be smaller than in an
acquisition due to headquarters

being located in different states.

I examine returns for bidders and targets using the following variables: 1.) mergers of
equals, 2.) acquisitions, 3.) firms headquartered in the same state, and 4.) firms
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headquartered in different states. I conduct five tests to cover all relevant combinations. The
first step is to test if returns are greater when the two firms are headquartered in the same
state versus in a different state, also examined by DeLong (2000), regardless if the
transaction is an acquisition or a merger of equals. Next, I compare the returns of an
acquisition versus a merger of equals ifboth firms are headquartered in the same state,
followed by headquartered in different states. Finally I compare acquisition returns if the
firms are headquartered in different states versus same states, followed by the same test for
mergers of equals.
The rationale for these tests is as follows: first, I need to determine if returns of instate mergers are different from returns of out-of-state mergers. From here, I attempt to
ascertain whether the results are driven by merger of equals versus acquisition. If, as
DeLong (2000) and others suggest, geographically focused mergers have larger returns, there
are testable implications. In particular, in-state acquisitions should have the highest returns,
while out-of-state mergers of equals should have the lowest returns.
The first test of the difference in bidder returns is based on the location of
headquarters (in- versus out-of-state), despite whether the transaction is a merger of equals or
an acquisition. Mean returns for a transaction with headquarters of both firms being located
in different states as -1.28% versus in-state which has slightly higher returns of -0.47%.
The difference in these returns is marginally significant (p-value of 0.11). Mean target
returns with headquarters out-of-state are 15.38% versus in-state are 16.32%. For target
returns, the p-value is 0.59, which is not statistically different. Therefore, on average,
transactions where the firm's headquarters are located in the same state have smaller negative
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returns (in the case of bidders) or higher returns (in the case of targets) than if the
headquarters were located out-of-state, but are marginally different at best.
The next test compares returns from acquisitions when the headquarters of both firms
are in the same state versus mergers of equals. The mean bidder returns for an acquisition
are -1.18% versus for a merger of equals, 3.61%. The p-value for the difference in means
for bidder firms is 0.01. The returns for acquisitions are statistically different than returns for
mergers of equals when the two firms are located in the same state. These results support my
hypothesis that mergers of equals would have higher returns than acquisitions ifboth firms
are headquartered in the same state.
The mean returns for targets in an acquisition are 17.6% and 10.03% for mergers of
equals if the firms are headquartered in the same state. This shows that, for targets, there is
potential for higher returns, on average, if you are acquired (not in a merger of equals) ifboth
banks headquarters are located in the same state.
I then test the difference in returns between acquisitions and mergers of equals when
the bank headquarters are located in different states. For bidder firms, the mean returns for
acquisitions are -1.32% and -0.77% for mergers of equals. The p-value of the test of the
difference in means is 0.82; these returns are not statistically different. For targets, the mean
returns for acquisitions are 16.01% but only 6.26% for mergers of equals. Here, the
difference in mean returns is statistically significant (p-value of 0.01). Once again, it is more
beneficial for targets to enter an acquisition (versus a merger of equals).
The next two tests report important p-values, although the mean returns have been
reported previously due to an overlap in combinations. First, I compare out-of-state
headquarters to in-state headquarters for both mergers of equals and acquisitions. Bidder
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returns for mergers of equals are marginally significant (p-value equal to 0.12). Therefore,
the difference of the mergers of equals having headquarters in the same versus different
states is marginally significant for bidders. The target returns, however, are not statistically
different (p-value equal to 0.35). Therefore, it does not appear to benefit target shareholders
in mergers of equals if the firm is in the same state as its merger partner.
The last test is the same as above, but substitutes acquisitions for mergers of equals.
Neither in-state headquarters nor out-of-state headquarters are statistically significant in the
mean returns for bidders or targets (p-values of 0.77 and 0.42, respectively). Therefore, for
an acquisition, having both firms headquartered in-state shows no statistically different mean
returns than having both firms headquartered in different states for either the bidder or target
firms.

7. CORRELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS
7.1 Correlation

As a simple test of how variables in my regression analysis interact, I run a
correlation of the variables included in my regressions (See Table 6). A few of the
correlation coefficients and p-values are highlighted below. First, as expected, target and
bidder assets are highly positively correlated with the merger amount (both p-values are
0.00). This means that the larger the firms assets, the higher the merger amount.
Also, a merger of equals is positively correlated (p-value is 0.00) to the merger
amount. The higher the merger amount, the more likely the transaction is a merger of equals.
Again, this is to be expected, when considering the correlation of assets and merger amount,
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mergers of equals have relatively high assets, and both mergers of equals and asset size are
positively correlated with merger amount.
Lastly, bidder and target returns are significantly correlated with mergers of equals.
Bidder returns are positively correlated while target returns are inversely related to merger of
equals. Therefore, if a takeover is a merger of equals, then bidder firms returns are likely to
be larger (less negative), while the target firms returns are likely to be smaller than in an
acquisition.

7.2 Regression Analysis Results
To calculate abnormal returns, I focus on an event period of six days (-5, +1) around
the initial merger announcement date. The method used to calculate cumulative abnormal
returns for both bidders and targets is to calculate returns for each firm and then subtract a
market index to arrive at the firm's raw returns (BSARN, TSARN). The combined valueweighted returns of the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX markets are used to obtain market
returns.
In all regressions I run a Durbin-Watson test to check for serial correlation in the
error terms. In all cases, the test statistics are within the normal expected range. Therefore,
no serial autocorrelations exist in error terms. Therefore, no serial autocorrelations exist in
the error terms.

7.2.1 Target Returns

I test target cumulative abnormal target returns to see which independent variables are
related (See Table 7). The first regression tests the abnormal returns against, merger of
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equals (determined by the 40% asset ratio), and year of announcement of merger (Year) as
variables.
(2)

TSARN = ~o + ~1MOE + €1
The results show that the merger of equals variable is significantly related to target returns

(p-value is 0.00). Although significant, the adjusted R2 is only 0.04. This suggests that while
merger of equals is statistically significant in explaining target returns around bank merger
announcements, it does not provide high explanatory power.
The second regression includes the number of days to complete the merger (days),
type of funding (fund), and merger amount (amount), along with the previous variable in
equation 2.
TSARN = ~o+ ~1MOE + ~2 Days + ~3Fund + ~4Amount

(3)

+ €1

This test determines that merger of equals is still significantly related to target returns (pvalue is equal to 0.00), while adding the additional variables does not increase explanatory
power.
The next regression removes MOE and adds target assets (TGT Assets) and bidder
assets (BDR Assets). I include target and bidder assets because it is possible that the
significance of the MOE variable is merely a function of firm size.
TSARN =

~o

+ ~1TGT Assets + ~2 BDR Assets + ~3DayS + ~4Fund + ~5AmOunt + €1 (4)

The results show that the firm size (of either bidders or targets) is not significantly related to
target returns with respective p-values equal to 0.24 and 0.88. The adjusted

R2 for this test is

-0.00. This means that the additional target and bidder asset variables should not be added
because they take away from the explanatory power of the results.
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The final regression includes all variables in equation four and, in addition, includes
the merger of equals variable.
TSARN = Po + PITGT Assets + pz BDR Assets + P3DayS+ P4Fund + PsAmount +
(5)
The results show that the merger of equals variable is significantly related to target returns
with a p-value equal to 0.01. Again, the additional variables do not add explanatory power.
The adjustedRz for all tests is under 0.09. This lack in explanatory power, however,
is to be expected. The focus of these regression analyses is to determine if a takeover being a
merger of equals affects target returns; not to explain the existence of these returns.

7.2.2 Bidder Returns
In the next regression analysis (see table 8), I test bidder abnormal returns (BSARN)
against the merger of equals variable (determined by the 40% asset ratio).
(6)
The results show that the merger of equals variable is positively significantly related to
bidder returns (p-value equal to 0.00). This confirms results from the correlation and
difference in means tests that bidder returns are a function of whether the merger is a merger
of equals.
The next regression adds the following independent variables to equation 6: number
of days to complete the transaction (days), how the transaction is funded (fund), and the
merger amount (amount).
(7)
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Controlling for these additional variables, I still find that the merger of equals is statistically
significant. Moreover, funding is inversely related (but a p-value of 0.14). The remaining
variables are not statistically significant.
The next regression is the same as equation four, only the variables are regressed on
bidder returns. Again, I include bidder and target assets because it is possible that the
significance of the merger of equals variable is merely a function of firm size.
BSARN = ~o + ~l TOT Assets + ~2 BDR Assets + ~3Days + ~4Fund + ~5Amount + €l (8)

This test reveals that, unlike equation four, the target assets and merger amount are both
significantly related to bidder returns (both have a p-value eq~al to 0.00). Furthermore,
bidder assets are statistically significant in determining bidder returns (p-value is 0.06).
Bidder assets and merger amount are inversely related while target assets are positively
related.
Therefore, the final regression adds back the merger of equals variable to equation
eight.
BSARN = ~o + ~lTOT Assets + ~2 BDR Assets + ~3Days + ~4Fund + ~5AmOunt +

(9)
The results show that merger of equals, target assets, and merger amount are all significantly
related (p-values are equal to 0.03, 0.00, and 0.00, respectively). Also marginally significant
are bidder assets and type of funding with p-values equal to 0.17 and 0.12, respectively.
Bidder assets, type of funding, and merger amount are all inversely related.
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This study examines a large sample of 400 bank mergers that were completed during
the 1990 to 1998 time period. The basic premises of this analysis is to determine the
dynamics of mergers of equals and to test if they are fundamentally different than
acquisitions. Previous literature on bank mergers mentions the relevance of mergers of
equals to merger returns, but do not test the significance of these effects. Moreover, there
have only recently been enough mergers of equals to examine their wealth effects and
compare them to overall merger activity.
Over a six-day event window, cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for bidders
and targets involved in either a merger of equals or an acquisition. I find that, in a merger of
equals, both firms experience small, positive returns, while in an acquisition the bidder firm
experiences a loss in returns and the target firm enjoys a large increase in returns.
These results suggest that the shareholders of a target firm would rather be involved
in an acquisition than a merger of equals, so as to capitalize on the premium received.
However, the shareholders of a bidder firm would rather see their firm engage in a merger of
equals than acquire a target because of the small positive returns gained versus a zero to -2%
loss.
Controlling for such variables as merger of equals, merger amount, days to
completion, type of funding, firm size, and geographic location of headquarters, indicates
that in all cases, merger of equals significantly explain merger returns. In conjunction with
prior analysis, this study finds that geographical location of bidder and target headquarters
significantly affects merger returns.
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This study concludes that there are different mean returns for firms in a merger of
equals versus an acquisition across a large sample of mergers completed between the 1990
and 1998 time period. The implications from this analysis are that future studies need to
control for mergers of equals to better understand the wealth effects from bank mergers.

24

References

Baradwaj, B.G., Fraser, D.R., Furtado, E.P.H., 1990. Hostile bank takeover offers, Journal of
Banking and Finance 14, 1229-1242.
Becher, D.A., 2000. The valuation effects of bank mergers, Journal of Corporate, Finance 6,
199-214.
Benston, G.J., Hunt, W.C., Wall, L.D., 1995. Motivations for bank mergers and acquisitions:
enhancing the deposit insurance put option versus earnings diversification, Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 27, 777-788.
Boyd, J., Graham, S., 1991. Investigating the bank consolidation trend, Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 15,3-15.
Brewer, E., Jackson, W.E., Jagtiani, J.A., 2000. Impact of independent directors and the
regulatory environment on bank merger prices: evidence from takeover activity in the
1990s, Working paper.
Comment, R., Jarell, G.A., 1995. Corporate focus and stock returns, Journal of Financial
Economics 37, 67-87.
DeLong, G.L., 2001. Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank mergers,
Journal of Financial Economics 59, 221-252.
Houston, J.F., Ryngaert, M.D., 1994. The overall gains from large bank mergers, Journal of
Banking and Finance 18, 1155-1176.
Houston, Joel F., Christopher M. James, and Michael D. Ryngaert, 2001, Where do merger
gains come from? Bank mergers from the perspective of insiders and outsiders, Journal of
Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Koch, T.W., MacDonald, S.S., 2000. Bank Management,
Harcourt Publishers.

4th edition, The Dryden Press,

Milligan, J.W., 1996. Where's the beef? U.S. Banker 106, 8-9.
Saunders, M., 2001. Wachovia-First Union merger to produce no. 4 U.S. bank by assets.
SNL Securities: Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 16, 1.
Schwert, G.W., 2000. Hostility in takeovers: in the eyes of the beholder?, Journal of
Finance 55, 2599-2640.
Weston, J.F., Siu, J.A., Johnson, B.A., 2001. Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate
Governance.

3rd edn. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.

25

~
...
-.....
...
~
:=
01

a
:=
a
....
1:1
....
~

o
o
00

-o~
-00
N

r1.0
V)
N
00
o'<:t
00
1.0
N

o
o
1.0
o
or)

o
~
'<:t

o
~
0'1
00
-

00
v:
o
0'\
N

o
o
\0

~
o
o
r-

~
0'\
00
('<)
I

V)
~ ~o
o
~
-I

o~
~
o
NI

o
o
\0
0'1

r\0
-

o~
N
~
oI

N
~
roo
00

~
o
0'\
o
~
o
-

~
o
o
\0
~I

Table 2
Bidder and Target Returns by Asset Ratios
This table details net-of-market returns for bidder and target firms in 400 bank mergers from 19901998. Returns are segmented by type of merger (acquisition or merger of equals) and by different
asset ratios. Panel A defines MOE as an asset ratio of 40%. Panel B defines MOE as an asset ratio of
35%. Panel C defines MOE as an asset ratio of 30%. Asset ratio is defined as the target firm's assets
divided by the sum of the target and bidder firm's assets. Returns are calculated on a cumulative
basis over a six day window (-5, + 1) around the date of merger announcement and are net of market
returns.
Merger of
Equals

Acquisition

All
Mergers

Year
Panel A: MOE = 40% Asset Ratio
Bidder Returns (%)

-1.26

2.07

-0.91

Target Returns (%)

16.70

8.86

15.81

n.a.

Panel B: MOE = 35% Asset Ratio
Bidder Returns (%)

-1.27

1.52

Target Returns (%)

16.60

10.78

n.a.

Panel C: MOE = 30% Asset Ratio
Bidder Returns (%)

-1.29

0.77

n.a.

Target Returns (%)

16.81

11.72

n.a.
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Table 3
Summary Statistics by Merger Type
This table details summary statistics for acquisitions, merger of equals, and all mergers for a sample
of 400 bank mergers from 1990-1998. HQ same means the headquarters of the target and bidder
ftrms are located in the same state. HQ different means the headquarters of the target and bidder
ftrms are located in different states. The number of days is the length of time from merger
announcement to completion in days.

Variable

Acquisition

Merger of
Equals

AU
Mergers

Number of mergers

355

45

400

HQ same

152

32

184

42.82%

71.11 %

46.00%

203

13

216

57.18%

28.89%

54.00%

2,171.55

27,856.00

5,061.05

544.86

1,254.01

586.15

Mean Bidder Assets ($ billions)

21,741.27

29,621.58

22,627.81

Median Bidder Assets ($ billions)

10,015.10

1,117.48

9,679.72

Number of days

203.42

204.27

203.52

Mean merger amount ($ millions)

461.26

4,251.11

887.62

93.00

106.50

96.00

Percent of all HQ same
HQ different
Percent of all HQ different
Mean Target Assets ($ billions)
Median Target Assets ($ billions)

Median merger amount ($ millions)
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Table 5
Difference in Means
This table details the difference in means tests for bidder and target firms in 400 bank mergers
occurring between 1990 and 1998. Panel A tests acquisitions versus mergers of equals. Panel B
tests the outcome when considering headquarters location (located in the same state or different
states). The number of observations is in parentheses below the mean returns.

Bidder

Variables

Variable 1

Tar~et

p-value
p-value
of t-test:
of t-test:
Variable 1 vs.
Variable 1 vs.
Variable 2
Variable 2
Variable 1 Variable 2 Variable 2

Panel A: Acquisitions (Variable 1) versus MOE (Variable 2)
Returns

0.0171

Headquarters

0.0001
0.9478

Panel B: Headquarters Location
Out-of state (1)
vs. In-state (2)
Same State:
Acquisition (1)
versus MaE (2)

-1.28%
(215)

-0.47%
(175)

0.1128

15.38%
(216)

16.32%
(183)

0.5937

-1.18%
(149)

3.61%
(26)

0.0063

17.60%
(152)

10.03%
(31)

0.0024

Different State:
Acquisition (1)
versus MaE (2)

-1.32%
(201)

-0.77%
(14)

0.8154

16.01%
(202)

6.26%
(14)

0.0185

MOE:
Out-of state (1)
vs. In-state (2)

-0.77%
(14)

3.61%
(26)

0.1238

6.26%
(14)

10.03%
(31)

0.3549

Acquistion:
Out-of state (1)
vs. In-state (2)

-1.32%
(201)

-1.18%
(149)

0.7708

16.01%
(202)

17.60%
(152)

0.4180
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Table 7
Regression Analysis
This table details regression analysis on 400 bank mergers from 1990-1998 (p-va1ues of
coefficients are in parentheses). Panel A examines target returns while Panel B details bidder
returns. Assets are in $ billions while merger amount is in $ millions. Days to complete is the
number of days between the announcement date and completion date. Funding is based on how
the merger was financed (cash, stock, or mixture). 40% MOE is based on asset ratio defmed as
the ratio of pre-merger announcement target assets to target and bidder assets combined. Target
and bidder returns are net-of-market returns over a 6-day (-5, + 1) event window around the initial
announcement date. Net-of-market returns are calculated using simple abnormal returns, where a
value-weighted market index is subtracted from each firm's simple returns.
Variable

Equation 2

Equation 3

Equation 4

Equation 5

0.17
(0.00)

0.18
(0.00)

Panel A: Target Returns
Intercept

0.17
(0.00)

0.18
(0.00)

40% MOE

-0.08
(0.00)

-0.08
(0.01)
0.00
(0.27)

-0.08
(0.01)
0.00
(0.33)

0.00
(0.31)

Bidder Assets

0.00
(0.24)

0.00
(0.57)

Target Assets

0.00
(0.88)

0.00
(0.33)

Days

Funding

-0.02
(0.28)

-0.02
(0.26)

-0.02
(0.30)

Amount

0.00
(0.65)

-0.00
(0.56)

-0.00
(0.36)

0.02

-0.00

0.02

Adjusted R2

0.02
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Table 8
Regression Analysis
This table details regression analysis on 400 bank mergers from 1990-1998 (p-values of
coefficients are in parentheses). Panel A examines target returns while Panel B details bidder
returns. Assets are in $ billions while merger amount is in $ millions. Days to complete is the
number of days between the announcement date and completion date. Funding is based on how
the merger was financed (cash, stock, or mixture). 40% MOE is based on asset ratio defined as
the ratio of pre-merger announcement target assets to target and bidder assets combined. Target
and bidder returns are net-of-market returns over a 6-day (-5, + 1) event window around the initial
announcement date. Net-of-market returns are calculated using simple abnormal returns, where a
value-weighted market index is subtracted from each firm's simple returns.
Variable

Equation 6

Equation 7

Equation 8

Equation 9

0.00
(0.84)

0.00
(0.96)

Panel B: Bidder Returns

Intercept

-0.01
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.74)

40% MOE

0.03
(0.00)

0.03
(0.00)
~0.00
(0.36)

0.02
(0.03)
0.00
(0.55)

0.00
(0.54)

Bidder Assets

-0.00
(0.06)

-0.00
(0.17)

Target Assets

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Days

Funding

-0.01
(0.14)

-0.01
(0.13)

-0.01
(0.12)

Amount

-0.00
(0.93)

-0.00
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.00)

0.04

0.09

0.10

Adjusted R 2

0.04
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